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PROPERTY THEORY AND LAND-USE ANALYSIS - AN ESSAY 




This paper is concerned with one issue only« It argues that 
the development of a d e q u a t e theory for social science research in 
Africa must be predicated on a proper appreciation of the social 
foundations of the conceptual and methodological tools we have in-
herited from Western or othe; bodies of social science, We need to do 
this in order to determine the suitability of these ideas to specific 
analytical tasks in our societies The paper then proceeds to examine 
this argument in relation to law and land use analysis® The conclusion 
reached is that existing 'legal* and 'social* theories of lav/ do not 
offer an adequate framework for the analysis of land relations in African 
societies. It therefore calls for more systematic investigation in 
this regard and, more particularly, the search for alternative forms of 
clarifying legal relations not only in the narrow sphere of land 
relations but more generally in society,. 
PROLEGOMENON 
There is a great deal of debate in Africa today concerning the 
twin issues of the relevance of social science research to development 
planning and the manner in which the technical vocabulary^ concepts and 
methods we use to extract and communicate our findings condition our per-
ception of social facts,, choice of policy and prescriptions for action
0 
In this essay an attempt is made to confront these issues especially as 
they relate to law and land use analysiso Our underlying theme is that 
the development of adequate theory in this area as everywhere else must 
be based on a proper appreciation of the social foundations of the ideas 
we have inherited in sociolegal analysis^ particularly those in the field 
of land use, which came to us through the colonial process
0
 For it is 
only by doing this that we can determine whether or not these ideas can 
supply an adequate conceptual framework for the analysis of social be-
haviour in our societies
0 
On the Choice of Priorities 
The substantive concern of early researchers on law in Africa 
with the existence or non-existence of certain institutional arrangements 
in traditional society is not at all accidentale There were good academic 
as well as pragmatic reasons for doing so
0
 Colonialism had opened up 
tremendous opportunities to Western scholars for testing the validity of 
certain grand generalisations then current in their own particular 
disciplineso For British colonialism particularly
8
 this kind of informal 
tion was necessary for setting up an administrative regime in the colonies 
that would permit the maximum possible exploitation without fundamental 
alterations to the existing structural arrangements
0 
Thus early research was concerned mainly with the question of 
whether African (read 'primitive
9
) societies had 'law
0
o (See 45s 15 and 
34°) Later when this question had received some sort of answer
0
 attention 
turned to more specific aspects of law
0
 Scholars now wanted to know 





 and analogous insti-
tution? knew of 'ownership
0
 in land? and distinguished between "criminal
0 
2 
and ' Givil® law<> All these issues were at that time the subject of much 
3 
debate and confused thinking in the historical jurisprudence of 
lo This it seems to me was the political economy of indirect rule
c
 For 
another view of its operation in East Africa
8
 see Morris and Read (40)° 
2o For a bibliography on the land tenure question
9
 see Forde (l8)
0
 For 
the 'civil' and "criminal® law debate
9
 see Rattray (46)0 
3o The confusion has been traced in Gluckman (22) 3 to Maine (33) and 
Vinogradoff (59)0 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe as well as being of 
oruoial importance to colonial administrators.^ Indeed as colonialism 
became more and more established the system itself became a powerful 
5 
influence on the determination of research priorities. As colonial 
policy changed, so did the foous of the literature* Thus in the 
British sphere the change from "trusteeship' to what London called 
•development' brought with it a great deal of changes in the literature. 
Two important areas whioh researchers turned to were administration and 7 
lard tenure reform® 
As new debating points emerged in Anglo-American scholarship
1 
research priorities also changed to reflect these developments» One 
such development was the revolt against formalistic jurisprudence which 
erupted at Harvard Law School in the 1890s and the rise of what is now 
known as legal (or American) realism* At the centre of this revolt was 
the assertion that legaxphenomena -tfere essentially the creation of 
judicial institutions and processes and not legislative or social insti-
tutions « (See 23 and 28*) In short the early realists argued that in 
attempting to capture salient elements ahout law we should focus our 
attention primarily on the courts and the law reports» Case-method or 
court-oentred as opposed to rule-oriented analyses of law, however, did 
not become an important element in research in Africa until the publi-
o 
cation of the Cheyenne Way in 1941 (32); by which time colonial admin-
istrators were also beginning to give serious attention to the problem 
4 . Most of these early ethnographers were in fact employed by oolonial 
governments precisely for this purpose,, Perhaps th*> greatest monument 
to this partnership was the founding of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute 
towards the end of the 1930s, which for some thirty years operated as the 
colonial data bank for East and Central Africa. One of its typical field 
exercises was Allan, Gluckman and others (2). 
5* Colonial polioy Itself was not always consistent and predictable« 
The effect of this on the literature can be seen in the different assess-
ments that have been made of the theory of "indirect rule', suoh as 
Ghai's and MacAuslan's (20) and Morris's and Read's (40)» 
6* As to what development meant, See Lord Listowel (3l)„ 
For the agrarian policy background, see Hellen (27); for general 
policy, see Lord Hailey (24)» 
8« For the methodological effects of this work, see Obed Hag Ali (41). 
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of courts and administration of "justice" in the colonial contexto (41 
and 12) Thereafter the courts became the centre of attraction to legal 
anthropologists everywhere on the continent® (See for example 4a 21 and 
I 6 0 ) 
More recently the decolonisation process has raised a fresh 
set of questions which foreign scholars have not found easy to answer 
within their own current conceptual frameworks
G
 (26) Some of these 
include issues about the continuity of laws, internal conflicts
9
 "place® 
of customary law in national legal systems and legal "development";, etc
a 
The initial reaction was ethnographicals a series of rescue operations 
were conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s to "save" African law from 
9 
the deluge of 'modern" law that was expected to come after independence
9
" 
In the end, however, it was the historical jurisprudence of Europe and 
America that led the way as foreign scholars moved in to apply Weberian 10 
and Durkheimian generalisations to these fresh problemso Research 
alter independence turned to issues of law and "development" or "modern-
isation® - issues that were also clearly linked to the needs of the new 
economic order
t
 The entry of the m ilti-national corporation in the 
economic relationsmp between the metropolis and the ex-colonial 'per-
iphery' required a particular kind of law and in sufficient quantities 
if these organisations were to be sure of their holdo The question of 
legal 'development® by which was meant some replication of western legal 11 
institutions, was therefore considered cruciale 
On the Peri istenoe of Ideas 
It has been suggested so far that the choice of subject-matter 
of research can ho explninod suj a function of intel loctunl und iiloolo;-:! 
dependency.) The contention here is that the conceptual and methodological 
assumptions of the literature reflect a similar influences There are two 
9o This led to a series of conferences on the future of customary law, 
ultimately resulting in the restatement project of London University© 
For a summary of the arguments, see 4I0 
10
0
 Thus law and development programmes have flourished in African law 
schools0 For a summary of the core concept, see Trubek (56)0 
110 One attorney of a big New York multinational corporation specialising 
in service contracts argued at a speech to the Yale Association of Inter-
national Law that one of the most critical problems of the third world is 
"legal underdevelopment®, by which he meant that third world bureaucrats 
cannot understand the intricacies of contractual obligation in the advanced 
nations0 (personal communication from Speed Carrol, November 30, 1972) 
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points to make,5 The first point is that Anglo-American and lately Sino" 
Soviet ideas of law continue to dominate local research and policy-
making in many African countries
e
 This is manifested in several ways
e 
The first is in terms of continous importation of foreign laws and legal 
institutions into our legal systems especially in the more instrumental 
arease Importation has even been extended in some cases to areas in 
which it has been shown to be almost wholly irrelevant to significant 
aspects of social life
0
 This is particularly true of those countries 
in which foreign law is still seen by the law-making elite as a model 
for the future development of an integrated legal system® Without 
getting into matters of details it is our contention that for as long 
as we continue to import foreign law into our legal systems
8
 for that 
long will it be considered necessary to resort to the framework of 
foreign jurisprudential concepts in the description and analysis of law 
in Africa
0 
The second manifestation is in the style of law teaching and 
the intellectual background of law teachers themselves
0
 To many 
students of law, the statute books and law reports are still the most 
stable source of data available
0
 Whereas this may in part reflect the 
influence which the organised bar still exerts over the teaching of 
law, it also reflects the fact that there is still some tension among 
law teachers themselves between those who believe that the proper 
function of law schools is the production of technocrats, i®e
0
 those 
whose job it is to disentangle the syntactical webs of legislation and 
so keep the wheels of our legal systems moving, and those who favour 
broader orientation especially so as to incorporate the socioeconomic 
and political relationships through which legal phenomena are manifest® 
In any event, the fact that most of our law teachers have been trained 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence has meant that there is a general 
disinclination from any kind of theoretical or empirical concern over 
12 
non-doctrinal aspects of lav; teachings 
Partly because of increasing dissatisfaction with Anglo~ 
American jurisprudence, but also because of the emergence of a more 
ideologically committed social science approach, a different style 
of legal analysis has began to take shape in Africao This draws 
heavily from Marxist conceptions of law and legal relations generally® 
The centra,! theme is that the content of law is little more than ®a 
12o A summary of East African law writing quickly confirms this view® 
It was not until the emergence of the Eastern Africa Law_Re~view in I968 




reflex of an economic substrate
9
 namely the production relations in 
society
0
 This conception means that questions of origin, content and 
operation of law must in effect be answered in the same way, namely 
through an analysis of the class structure of society® (35 and / 2 
Neo-Marxist analyses of law in colonial and post-independence societies 
show quite clearly that some of our scholars have perhaps too readily 
accepted the validity of these generalisations
0
 This has led to a 
situation in which some scholars now regard an analysis of the political 
economy of society as coincident with an analysis of law
0
 In other words 
law expires as a conceptual category once its function is announced« 
(See for example 51°) 
The second point concerns methodology, particularly the nature 
of the technical vocabulary and concepts that have been used by scholars 
to extract and communicate data about socio-legal relationships in Africa
s 
It was accepted as a matter of course by early anthropologists that African 
systems could not be understood except through the conceptual glasses of 
Western jurisprudence® To young Gluckman, for example, African systems 
could only be understood by comparing them with the models erected by 
jurists in Europe and America
0
 "The very refinement of English juris-
prudence" luckman once wrote, "makes it a better instrument for analysis 
than are the languages of tribal law"o (21) Althoiigh contemporary opinion 
on the utility of these concepts is not quite as chauvinistic, the same 
claim is now being made under the umbrella of cross-cultural analysis, 
Vansina has put the case as follows : 
V/hereas it is true that each society will have its own 
legal concepts, its own procedure, its own substantive 
law, all adapted to the particular society, it is important 
to recogniseooo that
0
<,<> law is a social science and that 
as in all social science there exists a body of general 
norms which should be discoveredo (Vansina, in 22) 
Vansina and others who believe that a cross-cultural com-
parative method has been developed in Western social science are in 
effect saying much the same thing as their predecessors
0
 Bohannan, 
for example, while castigating Gluckman for translating English 'folk® 
systems into 'analytical® systems, seems reluctant to part with key 
concepts in common law jurisprudence
0
 Rather, he sees the possibility 
13« The expression is Dias's<, See 13o 
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« 6 
of making the very terms that so distorted the existing literature perform 
a new and respectable function, i*e
0
 the generation of 'general theories'
0 
All we need do, says Bohannan, is to change the type of questions we ask, ' • -- f< DST-swani &a tub .txs nx <faxnrt wsl 10 nox; O 
(4) The debate on methodology is still essentially confined to the ranks v 10 ojyioi( ; , is aeslo ORFIT TO S I B Y ^ I S N S I T B . ( I ^TFOLT IT 
of those foreign scholars who have for some time been concerned with 
empirical investigation of legal phenomena in Africa,, but there are signs 
that loca? scholarship iay not move much further from this bias* (3) o W O X J S E I I S T S N E ' G ssaxit J O ^.+.rbxl.FIV Jbejqsoojg 
THE UNDERDEVELOPMEMT OF THEORY yfow " :: . 55 •• • •.--.• 
J I - U ^ - J U O M I W TSS S X J . I B 50 V L U O N O O S 
The intellectual dependency outlined above has contributed to 
a situation of serious underdevelopment at the level of theory in this 
I J ? -io'I-
area of research* Legal theories tend simply to assume that a connection 
exists between law and land development; whereas facial' theories tend 
on the whole to overemphasise the purposive (ioOo instrumental) a a p e c t o f iSoi'iiA at mirtenoxri/-.fy'T ,;uodf s*&h aisatottMiMi h»<- + + 
law and thereby to distort the total context i'h which legal' ph^hemferta 
operate, 
T O I 
Of Legal Theory 
as D-) j'Teoos asw -tI 
on Jblx/oo amsjays 
jJ 'i Qii • > >/£ 
We start with some general points about legal, pop It lyis^,,^-., 
this being the central theoretical reference for the study of law iji
 4
|ast 
Africa* Very simply stated, the essence of positivism is ,that laws .... 
consist mainly of binding rules emanating from political; authorityy, which 
are distinct from moral precepts and arranged in an internally logical 
and systematic manner within a given country
0
 A look at legal research 
in East Africa shows that our scholars are still largely concerned with 
paraphrastic analysis of legislative rules® institutions and systems • • "JOOH 
interspersed in appropriate places only by judioial pronouncements of 
JrtsJioqmx s| tx . ' { fexoos i&LisoxtiBQ »rtd" of be foe he TIA ur r 
our courts of record* As a theory, positivism ik an invaluable technique 
of analysis especially on matters of identity and interr-relationships 
between legal rules„ But we find it incapable of Haridlihg non-legal 
-moo Leiirihf^ro—aao'io & fBrti evaxlaef oris* a-x^ii*^ m • 
phenomena* There are a number of reasons for this
s
 some of which have 







S LT6I!ft,SuO'i A S ' X 0 3 3 © 0 9 B 9 " X 0 TCXSRIRH BflX/LD O C T • . - / { + Hl«r»T O N •»• •k-S-
ago is that its fundamental ooncepts had reached a position or fixity 
long before the conditions with which law must deal to-day• Had
;
 corrto-'irito 
oxistenoe* Pound added that ams^axa V . i :
 1
 ? , . "-:-., . - : , . - . . - -1 « —'" ' »wv.'na/i/j'iqsx xx/Q wf.i flonsnoo nx a.tq&ojioo 
At this point when legal principles were taking a final 
shape, the growing point in human progress began to shift 
to the natural and physical sciences and,,their applications 
(.'••!>. '•?(r\c'-;o > in engineering, in the arts, and in the scientific culti-
vation of the soil and development of its resources* (Pound 
in 30) 
14<> For a short summary of what legal positivinm is, see Haxt (26)* 
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This observation remains as true today ae it was in 1907? only 
more so for us, since the socio-economic and political, problems with which 
law has to deal in the third world have been compounded by factors of which 
the development of positivism did not take account, e„go colonialism and 
15 
cultural diversity,, As such, it is impossible to explain through the 
framework of positivism such things as the dynamics of change within the 
law particularly the fact that certain types of legal institutions have 
the capacity to adapt to radical changes in society without any significant 16 
structural alterations within them
0 
It was this fixity, among other things„ that led to the rine of 
legal realism already mentioned.,, By directing its attention to the dispute 
process» realism constituted a significant departure from contemporary 
legal analysiso From a methodological point of view the dinpute process 
proved much easier to conceptualise, hence controlled investigation became 
possible within the framework of legal theory<> More substantively, atten-
tion shifted from an analysis of rules qua rules to institutions in which 
legal phenomena actively intervene
0
 There was also the possibility that 
one oonId within this framework Capture other social phenomena which 
interact with law in a wider social frameworko Nonetheless, the realist 
movement did. not in my view contribute nrach towards the development of a 
general theory of law and society,. The early realists were largely engaged, 
in ethnographic presentation of .judicial and analogous behaviour,, (See 16 
and 32, for example
0
) More recent attempts to convert the techniques of 
realistic jurisprudence into a social theory of law have not been entirely 
suooessfulo (For example, see 1„) Much as the resolution of disputes in 
society might form an important function of law„ this certainly is not its 
central function,. Indeed as Cardoso pointed out long ago, the dispute 
proceBB cannot be taken as a vantage point from which to analyse the nature„ 
function and limitations of law in society,, (6) The focus is too narrow 
and as such excludes significant networks into which legal phenomena enter
a 
1% Pound 'S plea then WAS for a sociological jurisprudence which would 
place law in the political and socio-eoonomi'o context in which it operates« 
16„ The olassic analysis of this is Renner's (48). The Land Ordinance 
of Tanzania has also survived without changes in its substratum, although 
between 1923, the date of its promulgation, and the present there have 
been very fundamental changes in ideology in Tanzania,, 
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Of Social Theory 
It has been suggested that the dominant legal theories do not 
offer much assistance in the study of law in societyo What we now 
suggest is that social theories of law have not made much headway either® 
By social theory of law we mean those approaches in which some social 
science theory is taken as a foundation for the study of law
0
 This is 
usually accompanied by the application of the methodology of social science 
research to the study of law® Generally speaking, this has been the 
domain of social scientists rather than lawyers
0
 A large number of these, 
however, tend to touch upon lav; only as part of the institutional rubric 
of socio-economic and political behaviour; hence the large literature on 
judicial processes, penal, family, land tenure and parliamentary insti-
tutions. This is an old slan\ in sociology
0
 The sociological framework of 
law for Durkheim, for example, writes Smith, "consists in the institutional 
machinery through which its regulation is manifest",, (in 50) 
This institutional fixation has often meant that in social 
science literature legal phenomena generally appear at the tail end of 
the social process and to the extent that law is U3ed or incorporated 
into the value system of society, this is usually seen as purely instru-
mental in character.. The best example of this is Marxist and Neo-Marxis'' 
analyses of law. There are two reasons why I think that Karl Marx's 
writings contain the seeds of a 'social® theory of laws
c
 Firstly, he put 
law in some sort of dynamic context, at any rate in terms of the analysis 
of pedigree and function
0
 The function of law, Marx argued, was to further 
the interests of the dominant classes in society, i®e
0
 those who control 
the means of productions, It follows therefore that as the class interests 
of a group become more and more developed and consolidated, legal trans-
formation will take place to further their achievement and protect ion a, 
Secondly, this context was framed in terms of an explicit social theory, 
i«e« that being the creation and handmaiden of bourgeois class interests, 
the legal element in human relations is bound to disappear with the attain-
ment of a socialist (classless) society,, (19) This, we suggest, consti-
17 
tutes a highly instrumental and deterministic view of legal regulation® 
17® Marx's approach should perhaps be reread in light of Engel's reinter-
pretation of the relationship between the base and super-structure* Engel's 
letter to Sparkenburg in 1894 emphasises the fact that the economic position 
is not "the cause and alone active" while everything else remains passive,. 
There is interaction "which ultimately always asserts itse]f"„ This opened 
up a whole new dimension to the analysis of law in society which neo-Marxists 




The effect is that many Marxist analyses seem to have fallen into what 
one Soviet legal scholar has described as the "morass of economic materi-
alism"® In such cases Vyshinski argued, ' We destroy the specific charac-
ter of law as an aggregate of the rules of conduct
y
 customs and the rules 
of community living established by the state and coercively protected by 
state authority",, (29) Although we do not share all of Vyshinski.
c
s 
notions of the nature of law, his observation is by and large a sound one® 
The result is that although the point at which traditional social science 
meets law is clear
v
 this tends to be conceptualised in such a way as to be 
of little assistance in the elucidation of law® 
Of Property Theory 
The Idea of Ownership in Legal Theory% This general state of theoretical 
underdevelopment is most pronounced in the field of property theory® 
Historically speaking^ thinking about land in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence centres around an analysis of the evolution of the 
concept of ownership, "a problem still as vital", says Hargreaves, "as 
it has been at any time since the evolution of private property"® (S,5» 
p„ 43) The concept, however, derives ultimately from the dominium of 
Roman law, "a frank acceptance of the existence of absolute ownership 
o«o over both chattels and land®®.® Balbus could not say that he was 
the 'temporary
8
 owner of a plot of land; he had either full dominium 
or no ownership at all®" (25, p® 44) Land as the subject of ownership 
did not in this context mean the soil, as such® The legal conception 
included all things that were attached to the land in such a manner as 
to be imbedded into it, and all things that were found under the soil® 
These were attributes which a tenant, whose rights were characterised 
18 
n s
 iura in re aliena,," had no right to remove® Later in a feudal 
context this meaning of land also characterised the division of things 
which a villein could or could not remove from the soil® 
The effect of feudalism on the Roman concept of ownership has 
been summarised as followss 
^ J - l U o „ ® separated the dominium .directum (the dominion 
of the soil)which £ it_yplaced mediately or immediately 
in the Grown from the dominium utile (the possessory title), 
the right to the use and profits in the soil designated 
by the term 'seisin' which is the highest a subject can 
acquire® (Black's Law Dictionary^ Fourteenth Edition, 1968) 
18® That is, rights in the land of another® 
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The relationship between the feudal lord arid villein, however was charac-
terised by the type of services which the latter gave in return for the 
protection he received from the former
6
 Thus emerges the doctrine of 
tenure as an expression of the vertical structure of feudal authority,, 
(See 37 and 10.) It may then be said that tenure referred to the manner 
in which land was held and being thus holden, tenure also referred to the 
ultimate form of political control over land so held
0 
The disappearance of feudalism left an interesting anachronism 
in property theory; the doctrine of tenure survived, even though as prop-
erty historians point out, it had long ceased to have any practical signifi-
cance « The more important concept after the feudal era was that of an 
estate in land, i.e
0
 the extent in time of a person's interest in lando (See 
38 and 52.) The survival of the doctrine of tenure, however, contributed 
to the emergence of the dogma that the Crown owned the land iri the Roman 
sonne while all that the tillers could have over the soil were certain 
19 
righto constituting 'property' over it„ Hence by the end of the nine-
teenth century propert, jurisprudence 'as, in effect, still bounded on the 
view that the basis of political authority over other people was owiitji
1
 B hip 
of land. It followed that no individual, community or other group could 
own land in the continental European sonse„ The theory said that tillers 
of the soil were tenants and they held of the Grown certain rights consti-
tuting property over the land; but while that implied a tenure relationship, 
no tenure arrangemenl could now be said to be involved,, To that extent, 
the theory was misleading; but it was nn important aspect of common law 
thinking at the time colonialism began in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 
The Idea of Ownership in a Colonial Contexts The idea of ownership was an 
important tool in the colonial process. It dominated the entire span of 
colonial land policy in the settler colonies„ The very first debates in 
the settlement of Kenya (then East African Protectorate) wore concerned 
19« This fiction lingers in English property theory despite the fact that 
tho Administration of Estates Act of 1925 has now abolished eocheat and 
replaced it with bona vacantia,, Thus the right of the Crown in land can 
no longer be viewed as vested and continuing ownership subject to an 
encumbrance, "but as a contigent right of succession to an interestate 
owner"} see Salmond on Jurisprudence (1.7) p« 413ff„ 
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with issues of title to lancL First it was the power of the Grown of 
England to alienate lands in a protectorate, then once that had been 
sorted out in English jurisprudence the issue turned to the question 
20 
of s e t t l e ownership vis-avis native rights» The latter question 
was resolved in a highly cavalier manner. It was said, for example, 
that African rights in land were in the nature of usufruct only -
meaning in this context that the right or interest lasted only as long 21 
as the land was in use. Two conclusions generally followed from thiss 
first that ownership, if it existed, lay elsewhere than in the users of 
the soil; and secondly that whatever was not being cultivated or occupied 
(i.e. by physical presence) was vacant land. It follows according to the 
English property notions we have discussed that vacant land was considered 
held by the territorial sovereign then in being, that is the colonial 22 
power, who was then free to grant it! 
This was used extensively to justify the expropriation, of 
so-called waste and unoccupied lands, in areas where there was no 
"settled form of government and where land had not been expropriated 
either to the local sovereign or to individuals" (Law Officers of the 
Grown
;
 1899)«> The manipulation went even further. Thus when the British 
South African Company
3
 acting on behalf of the Grown, raided Ndebele 
land in the late nineteenth century, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council found as 'fact' that the Ndebele tillers had not in the land 
23 
private rights worthy of protection even in the common law system. 
For in that system usufruct was not a private right being a right 'not 
amounting to ownership*
0
 In those parts of Africa in which social 
organisation had a strong military base, the literature spoke of very 
different juridical facts„ It was said that communal or even chiefly 24 
tenures existed in these areas - a finding that was extremely valuable. 
The conclusion of treaties with tribal chiefs was based on the assumption 
that the incidents of community ownership were vested in these function-
20. For the history, see Sorrensen (54) and R ;ii.ole (47)« 
21. See the opinions expressed in the Report of Stewart's Land Committee, 
1905. This committee was chaired by Lord Delamere. 
22. See the general tenor of the 1897 Land Regulations as applied to 
Kenya, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. C-8683 December 'i8)7. Also see 
Land Titles Ordinance of 1908, now Gap., 282, Laws of Kenya. 
23. Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) Appeal Gases, p. 233. 
24. That is in contradistinction to individual rights, o.f„ Privy Council 
Judgement .in Sakarivawo Osbodi v. Moraimo Ua.Vnl n. and others (1930) Appeal 
Cases, p. 667, in which chiefs were said to have reversionary rights in 
community land. ^ s / d p 209 
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25 aries. 
The point to be stressed here is that early administrators 
and ethnographers were trying to fit the facts of African land relationr 
into the conceptual categories of Western property theory. Where no fit 
was found, it was generally assumed that these facts conferred no measure 
of security in and of themselves. In doing so, however, they introduced 
fundamental misconceptions and serious distortions into land-use analysis. 
In saying that African cultivators and occupiers had usufruct only, these 
writers were simply wrong in thinking that the pattern of land use wa,s 
necessarily a function of tenure arrangement in the feudal sense. For 
usufruct in its original context and usage was a right of using and talcing 
the fruits of property belonging to another salva rerum substantia, i.e* 
without the right of destroying or changing the character of the thing 
and lasting only as long as the character remains unchanged. Speaking 
of the Barotse, a chastened Gluclcman aptly remarks, "... there is no 
one with a greater right to use the land than its present cultivator, and 
he has more than a right to take the fruits, he transmits his rights to 
his heirs." (22, p. 86) In saying that communities, families, tribes and 
other collectivities owned land, these writers were misled by the ideas of 
Sir Henry Maine and Paul Vinogradoff who spoke of communal ownership of 
land in early law. Hence they tended to question whether "a tribesman had 
any specific secure rights of ownership over particular parcels of lanc"« 
(;o) But in saying that chiefs owned land they were misled by a historical 
anachronism in English property theory into reading what I believe were 
26 
purely jurisdictional facts as ownership characteristics. For whereas 
tinder feudalism jurisdiction as a political fact was indeed founded on 
some form of dominium,it was one of the most significant effects of the 
disappearance of feudalism that jurisdiction ceased in fact to mean any 27 
form of ownership of the soil. 
25. See the Maasai 'Treaties' of 1904 and 1911. For a discussion of 
some of these issues, set Seaton and Maliti (49 ). 
26. Gluckman writes, "Since the people themselves in African states spoke 
of the chief as owner of tribal land they /"English jurists_7 tended to 
think that his subjects held no firm and secure rights in it but cultivated 
only by the chief's permission and to some extent at his capricious 
WLII ...". (20, p. 86) C.M.M. White has added that "the conception of 
ribal area and unit occupying territory" shoulu not be taken to mean 
that any person who comes within that territory acquired land by allocation; 
see 59, pp. 124-130. See also Pashukanis (42),p. 49, and J.O. Ibik, writer 
of the Malawi section of the Restatement Project (London, 197l)« 
27. English pr perty theorists would hotly dispute this view. For further 
clarification of the jurisdictional, as opposed to ownership, aspects of 
land, see Uchwndu (57). 
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The Idea of Ownership and Land Use Analysisg The search for ownership 
and tenure institutions in African society was not simply part of the 
process of making colonialism work, it was also part of an attempt tt_ 
sell a capitalist theory of law and land development. The theory;was 
that the formal rules of tenure, to the extent that they define ownership 
characteristics, are in crucial ways related to positive decision-making 
in land planning and use
D
 It was first argued that actual plajining and 
implementation of land use matters were wholly issues of individual 
initiative,, Property law assisted this initiative by conferring exclusive 
rights over particular parcels of land., Any form of external control, 
whichever way expressed, was therefore rejected, the argument being that 
these were unwarranted infractions upon vested rights
0
 Rules of non-
ownership character, to br legitimate and acceptable, had to be those 
and those only as lay within the bounds of private volition or privilege. 
The English economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith stated 
the argument as follows? 
A small proprietor.,. who knows every part ol his little 
territory, who views it all with the affection which 
property especially small property naturally inspires 
and who upon that account takes pleasure not only in 
cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of all 
improvers, the most industrious, the most intelligent 
and the most successful. (53, emphasis added) 
Even if we discount the peculiar problems posed by the agrarian conditions 
of eighteenth century Britain which formed the background to this and 
28 
analogous views, the underlying notion that private ownership of land 
is the key to positive decision-making in agrarian development survives 
29 
to this day. Its broader economic theory can be traced back to laizzez 
faire individualism - the moving force in the rise of capitalism in the 
Western world. 
The modern welfare modification to this argument has been stated 
by Denman as follows % 
Property rights / in the narrow sense meaning private 
rights J or rights analogous to them are in the last 
analysis the only power by which man can execute 
positive plans for the use of land and natural resources, 
(ll, emphasis added) 
The variation here is that some form of public participation in planning 
and possibly minimal land use administration is recognised. Implementation 
28. 
29. 
See also J.S. Mill's advocation of family farming in 39® 
See Doreen Warriner's comments in 60. 
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of plans is, however, left within the realm of private volition. In other 
words, the proper function of government according to the welfare approach 
is to provide an environment within which property power has the widest 
possible significance in terms of decision-making. The approach found 
strong advocates in colonial Africa. Thus in Kenya, th<» settlor ooromwit> 
often insisted on the provision of infrastructure, farm-planning facilities 
and extension services. They, however, pretty much controlled their own 
consumption and marketing. ^ The state was expected to reserve a power of 
intervention which occasionally could be used to secure proper develop-
31 
ment, but whether and when that power was to be used remained negotiable. 
In Marxist analyses, private property is generally conceived 
of as an institution with one specific function in society. Sweesy stated 
this as follows, 'property confers upon its owners freedcm from labour 
and the disposal over the labour of others and this is the essence of all 




 made it 
quite clear, however, that this did not apply to single-cornnv-lit'/.• pro-
ducing societies "where each producer owns and works his own ;« of 
production" since there would be no classes and hence no class domination® 
In other words, the relationship between property and land use was seen 
not in terms of psychosocial motivation as in capitalist property theory 
but in instrumental terms. The role of the state in this framework was 
similarly seen in historical terms. The state existed for the purpose 
of maintaining property relations. It did this through the application 
of force, reflected inter alia in public law. 
Pew attempts have been made to operationalise these different 
ways of looking at property relations, especially to set out in a systematic 
manner the linkages between proprietary phenomena and specific aspects of 
land-use behaviour. Professor Denman has now put v one juch framework within 
the context of Anglo-American theory. First of all he argues that the locus 
of decision-making in land use will be found in what he calls the proprietary 
land unit. 
Legal authority for taking decisions will 
lie in the property rights over land which 
in themselves will largely be fashioned by 
the local land law ...
0
 Because the subjects 
30. See the view reported in Meek (36). For earlier feuds with the 
colonial administration, see Remole (47). 
31. For example, although the colonial government interfered extensively 
with African land-use patterns then believed +•<•> primitive and 'pre-
judicial to the welfare of the country', f hardly ver intervened in 
settler agriculture, although most of the large sarins were grossly under-
developed, See Remole (47), Wolff (62), p. 78, ana van Zwanenberg (58), 
pp. 8-9. 
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matter, the physical soluii and its fixed improvements are 
co-ordinate in geographical space, the property rights 
which will authorise positive land use can be related
 f
 ..., 
to a particular place on the map and exten of land 
surface. And these two elements, the run of property 
rights and the area of land to which they pertain togetlier 
constitute the decision-making unit which is fundamental 
to all positive decisions about land use. (12, p. 18) 
This unit, Denman emphasises is merely "a particular variety within the 
genre of decision-making entities or units that provides the structural 
framework of an economy". (12, p« 18) Denman's second argument is that 
agrarian law (as we have explained it) enters this unit initially as 
a device used under the law to abstract from and reduce the bundle of • 
rights in the hands of a holder of a proprietary unite (12, p. 30) Ih 
this Denman is drawing attention to an important point which will figure 
much later, i.e. that it is not enough to look at substantive property 
law even if your sole interest is to find out the quantum of rights a 
holder has. Thirdly, Denman has set out the variables that enter into 
the dynamics of this framework. These are basically socio-economic and 
include such things G3 capi al goods (either singly or as an arrange-
ment of related things designed to provide services essential to economic 
survival), consociate wealth (i.e. wealth external to the unitj>which is 
held by the same person and can be assimilated to the unit), predisposing 
factors (i.e. set of givens such as restrictive ohape and 
contiguity of unitn, etc.), motives and externalities Associated with 
32 
the socio-economic system. Agrarian law also reappears in the frame-
work as a simple statement of inputs to be included in decision making 
but which do not necessarily determine or influence plans except; in 
cases of "planning by prohibition". (12, p. 99 ff.) ... | ....... 
Denman's framework contains some valuable i n s i g h t s f o r example 
that ownership rights create some kind of expectation in the minds of the 
holders with respect to the thing owned® But as a framework of analysis 





Firstj the framework is built around an important concept which is not 
clearly defined. What is the nature of economic decision-making and itfhat 
is the basis for suggesting that its structural frame is defined by legal 
32. For a fuller treatment of the traditional economic argument about 
property rights and decision-making, see Demesetz (8) and (9); also 
Johnson (30). 
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phenomena? Second, Denman's analysis distorts the nature of proprietary 
phenomena in that it seems to assume that it is possible to determine the 
size of a bundle of rights held by land users in isolation from the total 
socio-economic context in which these rights have meaning. A proper 
appreciation of property systems the world over will show that the distinct 
tion between private and public domains of legal power is no longer tenable» 
Whatever power is expressed in the idea of ownership is progressively being 
diminished in significance by such external factors as the practical 
necessities of population growth and the crisis of food production that 
demand greater public participation in land use policy and activity® Delafons 
reports for example that although Americans continue to carry a very strong 
prejudice against external control over any aspect of the economy? "The 
massive intervention by the federal government in... agriculture and 
housing purchase finance shows that the system is less free and less 
enterprising than is usually represented",, (7? Po 7) In a memorable 
passage he adds? "If the contols exercised by public authorities over 
land use in America seem excessively detailed and capricious, the controls 
happily adopted by private citizens are positively sadistic "o (7 , Pa 85) 
Further, Denman's concept of property in land, tied as it is to the idea 
of exclusive rights, may not cater for systems of land use in which 
security is not based on title but rather on use and fulfilment of a 
'..specific set of community obligations. (22, p. 78 ff., and 5) 
Third, the analysis tends to distort the nature of economic 
activity in the contemporary world
0
 Any theory whose basis premise posits 
V > 
private rights in land ends up by equating economic activity with individual 
enterprise. Thus the inter-dependence of levels of economic decision-making, 
e.g. planning and administration, is completely lost sight of. For example, 
it would be misleading to analyse settler agriculture in Kenya as a function 
purely of private enterprise and motivation since it was through active 
state participation and systematic raids into the African ("subsistence") 
sector that it was possible to consolidate a viable industry. (58) In my 
view, the distinction between public and private domains of economic activity 
is also no longer tenable, certainly not in Africa and the plan-oriented 
economies of the socialist worldo f 
Fourth, the analysis throws little light on the political process 
which forms the context of any land-use system. We are not here concerned 




the ontological question,, ice® the extent to which property relatione 
in society are c function of political relations and vice versa and how 
this affecte land use® It is not possible within Denman's theory to assess 
what influence ownership itself would have on the wider issue of resource 
allocation in society® Lastly, ownership-oriented analyses are misleading' 
as a policy prescription® In formulating policies for land reform, colonial 
and post-independence policy-makers in Kenya
9
 for example, thought that 
tenure reform would lead automatically to reform of land use
0
 It is becoming 
increasingly evident that although tenure has some relevance, it is not the 
8
Ark oi the Covenant in the temple of land use"! 
Marxist theory, as I have said
8
 is in essence a theory of politi— 
cr-
1
 . Lao:.'uiio lut'ier that of law qua law® The operational dimensions 
oi j.ts approach to property as a legal concept have to be found within that 
wider framework® Much as this approach is valuable in illuminating certain 
apects of land relations in colonial contexts
8
 e®g® that between settlers 
and African labourers
9
 its explanatory power would be considerably reduced 
when confronted with the facts of subsistence agriculture® It. is not enough 
to say that property ha,s no significance because no exchange relations can 
be established as an on-going process® That would be too narrow a view of 
legal phenomena® Indeed Marxist property theory„ as Karl Renner suggested, 
long ago, cannot adequately explain the transformation of property norms 
into public utilities which as we have indicated is an important element of' 
legal relations (Renner 1949)o 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
'Phe situation described above draws attention to several import 
tant points® Two general conclusions about the sociology of ideas may be 
drawn from it® The first is that there is need to fashion our research 
Bubject-matter out of local concerns and priorities® We cannot build 
successfully on the literature we have inherited because much of it reflects 
utilities and opportunities not in tune with our own® Secondly, we should 
at least be aware that the key tools of analysis that we have inherited — 
both conceptual and methodological — conceal biases that are not only 
33o I hijacked this expression from Dr® MoCrG, Mutiso of the Depart-
ment of Government
v
 University of Nairobi
0
 To him, the expression 
refers to attitudes which people develop about land which express its 
intrinsic or mystical value to them, and the idea that many people 
define their personal identity to include ownership of lando 
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intellectual in nature but ideological in origin as well
0
 The ideological 
biases in the existing body of ideas seem to me to include an assumption 
that the path of development for the third world will in some way duplicate 
that of present technologically advanced societies. This sort of historical 
determinism is not a recent phenomenon, but it came to assume a new signifi-
cance in Africa as many colonial administrators and early researchers 
became increasingly convinced that the colonial process was an attempt, 
inter alia to hasten this inevitable progression 
More specifically, it is clear that land-use cholars have so 
far not succeeded in providing a meaningful framework within which to 
analyse the nature of legal phenomena both in the narrow sphere of land 
relations and more generally in society,, Consequently, there is great 
need for systematic investigation of the role of law in our own societies,, 
This is particularly crucial if we are to correctly evaluate more concrete 
problems, such as the utility of foreign legal transfers to specific socio-
economic taskso 
The implications for theory and research are obviouss now and 
alternative forms of clarifying sociolegal relations must be proffered. 
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